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ABSTRACT
This thesis records the results of a data-based analysis of worldwide maritime piracy
incidents against commercial merchant shipping from January 1989 to September 1993.
The intent of developing this database was to create the framework that permits a rigorous
statistical analysis of maritime piracy. It begins with a descriptive assessment of the scope
and impact of piracy worldwide. Next, it identifies the statistically supportable regional
and international trends in maritime piracy over the last five years. The database has been
designed at the unclassified level to allow maximum access by the intelligence community
and the commercial shipping industry. The database includes 523 reported cases of piracy.
Piracy is defined as the act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other
crime and with the capability to use force in the furtherance of the act. Both incident
details and ship characteristics have been incorporated in the database. The ultimate goal
has been to develop a comprehensive statistical picture of where piracy occurs and how
pirate attacks are carried out.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis presents a data-based assessment of international and regional
trends in maritime piracy between 1989-1993. The assessment was carried out
using the Violence At Sea (VAS) database. VAS is an original database
developed by the author under the sponsorship of and in cooperation with the
Office of Naval Intelligence. The VAS database is structurally complex, it
contains 118 data fields. The large number of fields are necessary to capture the
wide variety of information which is available from the shipping industry and
other maritime data sources. VAS contains data from 523 reports of pirate attacks
on commercial merchant shipping worldwide between 1989-1993. The data were
compiled using multiple independent sources which report on the incidence of
piracy. VAS was designed to be compatible with the interagency Joint Maritime
Information Element, which is an on-line maritime data resource available to
users at the secret level. The VAS database is unclassified.
This study begins with a general descriptive assessment of the scope of
piracy worldwide. The author does not speculate on possible solutions for
eliminating or reducing the level of piracy, nor is general threat an area of
assessment. One cannot presume to suggest what measures are appropriate in
any region without first taking into account the financial, material and political
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constraints that face those countries that are confronted with a piracy threat. Such
factors were not pertinent to the focus of this assessment. For the purposes of
this study, piracy is defined as "the act of boarding any vessel with the intent to
commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force in the furtherance
of the act." This definition will therefore include cases of robbery which occur in
a state's territorial waters. It also includes cases of interdiction, i.e., the stopping
and boarding of ships in territorial or international waters by state authorities.
Classic "high seas" piracy is not observed nearly as frequently in the modern
maritime world.
Next, VAS reports briefly on international and regional trends in maritime
piracy. International trends are assessed broadly as a function of the shifting
patterns of pirate activity and the modus operandi of the pirates. Data have been
compiled on an annual basis and separated into general regions. Although trends
which show apparent "migration" of pirates across different regions are
observable given one interpretation of the data, the reader is cautioned not to
infer from this that the same pirates move from one location to another. Piracy
is a completely local phenomenon. Hence, the reader must be careful not to
accept the generalizations presented, even for a single region, as applicable
throughout that region. Assessment variables for the international level of
analysis were chosen to allow the reader to view the results from the operational
vn
perspective of the mariner.
Regional analysis was made possible by first separating pirate attacks into
12 regions. The regions were delineated after the attacks were coded. Of the 12
regions, only five (with 88% of the total) contained enough data to allow for a
trends analysis. The regional analysis was aimed primarily at identifying and
detailing the conditions which exist during a pirate attack. The South/East Asia
region was by far the area with the largest number of incidents, with over 54%
of the total number of attacks worldwide being reported there. Northeast Asia,
Indonesia, West Africa and South America were also examined in some detail.
Understanding the scope of maritime piracy is a prerequisite for being able
to assess its impact on international maritime trade. The results presented in this
study represent a first level assessment of the data on piracy over the last five
years. There is a wealth of additional information available in the VAS database.
Its analytical value will grow as the database is gradually extended over time.
Ultimately, VAS will be expanded to assess all elements of maritime violence.
Vlll
I. MARITIME PIRACY - BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE
Maritime piracy is a phenomenon about which most individuals not
associated with the maritime community know very little. The common
perception of the general public on piracy is that it is any act of violence
occurring anywhere on the oceans. 1 In fact, by the classic legal definition, true
"piracy" occurs only on the high seas. There have been over 500 reported acts of
piracy committed against merchant shipping interests worldwide during the last
five years. This level of piracy is not unprecedented in recent history however.
In the early 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in the incidence of piracy
worldwide. In fact, the number of piracy attacks between 1981-1983 is roughly
comparable to the high levels recorded in 1991. 2 The heart of this thesis is the
Violence At Sea (VAS) database. It was specifically designed to assess piracy
between 1989-1993. The best reporting for acts of piracy is for the 1991-1993 time
1
I. R. Hyslop, "Contemporary Piracy," in Eric Ellen (ed.), Piracy At Sea
(London: ICC Publishing SA, 1989). 7.
2See the International Maritime Bureau Chronology of Pirate Attacks on
Merchant Vessels for 1981-1987 in Piracy At Sea, Eric Ellen (ed.), London: ICC
Publishing, SA, 1989, Appendix 1.
period. Reports in 1989 and 1990 are disproportionately small. Anecdotal
evidence, however, suggests that the entire period for VAS is underreported.3
Until the shipping industry begins to place greater emphasis on the human
rather than the simple economic costs of piracy, little is likely to change. There
have been some notable efforts to curb pirate attacks in selected regions around
the globe, but pirates are inclined to follow the path of least resistance, and such
paths are abundant worldwide. That is not to suggest that pirates migrate to
areas less well policed, but rather that they are prudent not to challenge an
authoritative presence dedicated to countering them in a particular region. The
odds that a pirate attack will be successful is high. Pirates routinely intimidate
their victims and the maritime community at large. With few exceptions, piracy
is robbery, nothing more.
Although the shipping industry has been forced to acknowledge the fact of
piracy, there is still great reluctance on its part to address the problem directly.
Thus far, the impact of piracy has not presented an economic hardship for the
shipping industry at large. Piracy is largely regarded by those who control the
industry as a low-level criminal nuisance. The percentage of maritime trade that
is affected by pirates is insignificant compared to the total volume of trade and
'Estimates on the under reporting factor in piracy range from 20-50%.
associated profits magnitude of profits of shipping interests worldwide.4
Consequently, controlling elements in the shipping industry have little incentive
to report pirate attacks. The principal victims of piracy are the mariners who
operate the vessels at sea. Many masters who have been victims of piracy never
return to sea following their encounters with pirates. 5
There are many reasons why attacks are not reported. Masters often fear
that being a victim of piracy reflects unfavorably on their discipline and
watchkeeping. Similarly, they fear the associated port delays which are
frequently necessitated by the investigation process. Also, by highlighting
themselves, they believe their risk of further attack is increased. Ship's owners
often feel their credibility is compromised when their vessels are attacked by
pirates. There is also the problem of causing diplomatic offense to the country
where they must regularly trade. The possibility of rising insurance costs is a
problem, as is the demand by unions and crews for hazard pay in areas of
increased risk. Finally, the states themselves may want to keep attacks secret for
Additionally, the likelihood of being attacked by pirates, even in areas of high
pirate activity, is about 1 in 1000.
5This is according to a retired master who is still associated with the shipping
industry. The statement was made during the Royal Navy Anti-Piracy Seminar
held at HMS Dryad, 7-8 September 1993.
reasons of commercial or national security. 6 But for the individual mariner that
must come face-to-face with pirates at the operational level, the reality is quite
different.
The potential for an environmental disaster directly or indirectly related to
a pirate attack is increasing as a function of the relative numbers of incidents.
Merchant vessels that have been victimized by pirates in the recent past have at
times been "not under command" for extended periods in crowded, narrow
straits. Scenarios have involved Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tanker assets
that have been fully loaded with petroleum products at the time of attack.7
During such an attack, pirates are not concerned with the ship's navigation, their
interest is confined to a very limited range of concerns while they are onboard.
"The United States imports forty-five to fifty per cent of its petroleum needs,
and a very significant proportion of those imports arrive by tanker."8 This reality
highlights the need to be conscious of the threat to tanker traffic worldwide.
Over 25 percent of the pirate attacks recorded in the Violence At Sea9 database
6L R. Hyslop, "Contemporary Piracy," 5.
7On November 10, 1991, while underway in the Phillip Channel near
Singapore, the 275,551 DWT Panamanian-flagged tanker Eastern Power, fully
loaded with crude oil, was attacked by pirates and not under navigation by its
crew (who had been tied up) for 15-20 minutes.
8U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence, Office of Threat
Assessment. Piracy: The Threat to Tanker Traffic, March, 1993.
9The VAS database is the exclusive tool for analysis in this thesis.
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were against a tanker of some description. One or several tanker attacks, even
if they resulted in a total loss of cargo, however, would not appreciably impact
the overall volume of oil which is imported by the United States. However, a
repeat of a disaster comparable to the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska several years
ago would have catastrophic consequences on all aspects of life for residents of
a congested area such as Singapore. The implication of repeated incidents of this
type would be devastating at the regional level. 10
At issue is the threat that piracy represents to the interests of all nations, not
just those involved directly in maritime commerce. Nations that do not operate
extensive merchant shipping fleets and even nations that have no coastline
whatsoever are still affected. Maritime trade is the primary means by which
nations interact economically, and since piracy affects that trade, it impacts all
nations. Therefore, it is important to analyze piracy in complete detail to afford
researchers the best opportunity to explain what can be done to limit its impact
in the future.
This thesis is not an assessment of the threat to merchant traffic per se. On
the surface, it is a very brief review of a worldwide analysis of the piracy
phenomenon. Behind this review is a complex database which will continue to
provide the basis for assessments of piracy and maritime violence. This Violence
10Merchant traffic in the Straits areas near Singapore is the heaviest in the
world. At least 30,000 large merchant vessels transit the area annually.
At Sea (VAS) database was developed by the author. The data contained in it
have been compiled using a wide variety of reporting sources on pirate attacks
worldwide. 11 This thesis will not detail an extensive plan for the eradication of
piracy. Its first purpose is descriptive. Its second purpose is to lay the analytical
groundwork for a continuing data-based assessment of international and regional
trends in piracy. This effort will be carried on and extended by the Center for the
Study of Political Violence at the Naval Postgraduate School in association with
the Office of Naval Intelligence.
A. THE VIOLENCE AT SEA (VAS) DATABASE
1. Concept/Scope/Purpose/Limitations.
The VAS database was designed exclusively for the purpose of
analyzing piracy and other acts of maritime violence. It presently operates at the
unclassified level. Its structure was designed with the ultimate goal of being
1Sources were: Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) data, Defense Mapping
Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center NAVINFONET Anti-Shipping
Activity Messages, U.S Department of Energy-Pzracy: The Threat to Tanker Traffic,
International Maritime Bureau (1MB) reports and publications, including the Far
East Regional Office periodic reports, International Maritime Organization (IMO)
quarterly reports, Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports, Lloyd's List, Selected open press
reporting, Ship's masters reports, Shipowner Associations data, Ship Management
Company reports, Official Investigations, Hong Kong Marine Rescue and
Coordination Centre (HKMRCC) data, and a private chronology of incidents at
sea entitled An Analysis ofIncidents ofPost-War Terrorism, Piracy, Sabotage, and other
forms of Violence relating to Ports, Harbors and Roadsteads, compiled by Samuel P.
Menefee of the University of Virginia School of Law.
incorporated into the interagency Joint Maritime Information Element (JMIE). 12
Hence, many of the database's fields are set up to be easily translated into a JMIE-
compatible format. In its present form, the database is comprised of 118 data
fields. Appendix A is a reproduction of the data collection instrument which was
used as the hard-copy record of individual incidents that were consolidated in
VAS. The large number of fields are necessary to capture the variety of
information which is available from the many sources which currently report on
attacks of piracy. Although numerous formats have been proposed and used to
report these attacks, there is still no standard which is commonly used.
After reviewing a sample of the type of piracy data that were available,
a database concept was formulated and the data collection instrument that
appears as Figure 1 was created. Despite the author's thorough review of the
available source information before VAS was designed, it was still necessary to
modify it on many occasions after the initial structure was developed. Many
piracy experts were consulted during every step. 13 For analysis purposes, it is
important to note that this database contains the population (1989-1993) of known,
12JMIE is a secret level on-line system capable of being accessed by up to 100
remote workstations. Users can download query-controlled raw data for
analytical purposes. The list of maritime information sources which provide data
to JMIE is extensive.
13Analysts at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI-21) and members of the
Naval Postgraduate School faculty and staff were the key contributors in this
development.
reported attacks of piracy. It is not a sample. When examining the available
data, it is also important to note that data for 1993 cover only the period through
September. Although it is possible to perform a linear extrapolation of the data
to arrive at an estimate for the number of attacks for the entire year, given the
seasonal variance in pirate attacks, this was not done.
The data instrument was designed to capture information that was
reported in nearly every attack (such as date, time category, vessel
name/flag/status, and general region where the attack occurred) as well as bits
of data which were more esoteric in nature (vessel speed, crew size, and last and
destination ports of call). The source(s) used for coding each attack were very
carefully documented in the SOURCE field of VAS. All information in VAS was
meticulously cross-referenced and no piece of information was accepted at face
value. In addition, the information was arranged in the computer database to
permit easy access and convenient data entry. 14 Nevertheless, the nature of the
sources of raw data was such that coding decisions were constantly required to
allow for a consistent coding process. 15
14
It is improbable that a machine-readable format can be developed for VAS.
The sources of information on piracy are simply too diverse. There is no
substitute for the manual process that a researcher must follow in this case.
15A ten-page Coding Instructions booklet was produced to ensure that future
researchers continue with a consistent coding process.
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Although much of the information contained in the VAS database is
already available to the user elsewhere in a raw or processed form, VAS has
consolidated it into a single user-friendly location. 16 When the database is
incorporated onto the JMIE host, its availability will greatly expand. Although
more data is undoubtedly available at higher levels of classification, the decision
to keep VAS unclassified was made to permit the greatest possible access. 17 One
of the primary benefactors of VAS will be the shipping industry.
Because of the very large numbers of fields, the possible combinations
of single or multi-variable analysis which can legitimately be queried using VAS
is enormous. However, many fields do not presently contain enough data to
allow those queries to be done. For this analysis, the author made the decisions
on which single and multi-variable combinations to use. For the international
analysis, fields were normally selected which had the greatest number of
responses. This allowed for the most accurate generalizations to be made. In the
regional analysis section, the percentage of total responses for that region was the
yardstick for selection.
16The database software in use for VAS is Superbase version 2.0 for Windows.
17Although JMIE is a secret on-line system, periodic unclassified reporting will
be made available to agencies which request it.
VAS incorporates the most comprehensive, thoroughly cross-referenced
piracy source compilation now available. In many cases however, an individual
attack is still only addressed by a single data source. As expected, data from
various sources on a given incident were frequently different. In some cases,
where the data were significantly different, it became necessary to make a
determination about which information would be entered into the database. In
these cases, an extensive manual and computer assisted cross-referencing of
information was performed. The coding procedure for this first iteration of VAS
was done exclusively by the author. Also, as more cases were examined, the
experience of dealing with the data became even more useful in the complicated
deconfliction process that was necessary. There was an exhaustive attempt to
deconflict incidents long after they were first recorded in VAS. As a result, many
incidents were consolidated based on the similarity of the information available
from the separate data sources.
The classification of the general regions (GRL_REGION) was the most
important organizational decision concerning the VAS structure. 12 general
regions were established (see Figure 1). These regions were generated after the
data were coded. Therefore, the regions were designated to permit a neat
10
geographical fit of the attacks. Attacks were included as part of a land mass
when they occurred within 30 nautical miles of the mainland of that land mass. 18
B. DEFINITIONS.
No attempt has been made to make a legal distinction between piracy19 and
simple maritime robbery, which is technically what the majority of cases in this
study are. However, such distinctions are quite transparent to the unfortunate
victims of piracy. Consequently, piracy is defined (using a 1992 International
Maritime Bureau definition) without regard to the location where it occurred:
The act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other
crime and with the capability to use force in the furtherance of the
act.
20
Cases of interdiction21 are included in this definition of piracy. The attacks
have been categorized according to whether or not they occurred in international
or territorial waters, and analysis was performed on this field. Once again, the
classification of exactly whose waters were involved is often difficult because of
18Limited exceptions to this general rule did occur, particularly when the land
mass was an isolated island in open ocean areas.
"Classic piracy occurs on the "high seas," not within the territorial waters of
any state.
Z0Special Report - Piracy, ICC International Maritime Bureau publication, June,
1992, 2.
21
Interdiction (i.e. Interception), as defined by the Hong Kong Government
Secretariat, is the stopping and boarding of ships in territorial or international waters
by state authorities.
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overlapping jurisdictions and variable claims of sovereignty. The area near
Singapore is especially troublesome (See Figure 2). Additionally, no attempt was
made to calculate distance from shore in the Phillip Channel, a scene of numerous
attacks, and the majority of cases occurring in the Singapore Strait. The proximity
to land for attacks in these areas and calculations of average distance are not
meaningful.
C. DATABASE PARTICULARS.
Although no minimum vessel size has been established to qualify an attack
for inclusion into this database, the vast majority of cases involve large (greater
than 500 tons) commercial merchant vessels that have been victimized by pirates.
Cases of attacks on refugees (i.e., "boat people") are omitted, but not because they
are considered unimportant but because they are thought to represent a different
facet of the piracy phenomenon which requires independent attention. Likewise,
attacks on private yachts have been omitted, with the exception of one case.22
For the purposes of this database, pirate attacks have been divided into three
time spans. Short term seizures typically last less than one hour but occasionally
continue for up to four hours. For example, underway attacks are characterized
by longer short term duration, because vessels are frequently chased for several
hours before a boarding can be attempted or made. Long term seizures normally
22This attack occurred 20 miles south of Nice, France, an area presumably free
from piracy. A yacht valued at one million dollars was permanently seized.
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last for as long as it takes the pirates to transload the victim vessel's cargo, which,
depending on the means available, lasts one day to one week. Permanent
seizures are coded according to the ultimate disposition of the targeted vessel.
D. ASSESSMENT PARAMETERS.
1. International Assessment.
The overview of international trends focuses on data which have been
compiled on an annual basis and separated into general regions. Raw numbers
have been included for reference, but generally, the analytical results will be
presented on the basis of a percentage of the total number of cases reporting each
variable. The chapter on international analysis will begin with a general
descriptive overview. This will enable the reader to become familiar with the
basic scope of modern maritime piracy. Once an understanding is gained about
the level of the problem, one can better appreciate the trends that emerge from
the analysis. International trends will be assessed broadly as a function of the
shifting patterns of pirate activity and the modus operandi of the pirates. This
assessment will incorporate a selection of variables that lend themselves to useful
analysis based on the amount of data available on that variable.
2. Regional Assessment.
Regional analysis will concentrate on only five of the 12 defined
regions. (See Figure 1) Attacks in these regions comprise 88% of the attacks
worldwide for the entire period. Although some effort will be made to compare
13
across regions, this will be done primarily in the international analysis section.
Regional analysis will follow a format which will permit the reader to compare
similar phenomena and data for each region. The regional analysis will focus
primarily on South/East Asia because attacks there represent over 54% of the
total attacks worldwide. It is important to understand that, with a few
exceptions,23 these regions are completely distinct. Pirates do not belong to an
international syndicate that cooperates by sharing information and technique.
Even pirates that are operating in the same region as defined in this study are, in
virtually every instance, independent actors. Hence, while the regional analysis
attempts to group elements together within a particular region, this does not
always mean that those generalizations are completely applicable throughout the
region.
23'The area near Singapore for example.
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II. INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT
A. OVERVIEW.
Although the incidence of pirate attacks have been separated into 12 general
regions, only the South/East Asia (Region 1), Northeast Asia (Region 2),
Indonesia (Region 3), West Africa (Region 5) and South America (Region 8) areas
contain sufficient numbers of attacks to permit useful analysis. Figure 3 depicts
the number of attacks per region for the entire period of investigation, and Figure
4 graphs the percentage of the total that these attacks represent for the top five
regions. Before presenting the results of the analysis, it is necessary to present an
overall picture of piracy at the international level, i.e., characteristics and
descriptions which generalize about the big picture of piracy. As throughout this
thesis, all data were highly dependent on the level of reporting that was available
for use. While the actual numbers of attacks are certainly larger, we can
reasonably assume that they are proportionally greater for all years under
consideration.
For the international level of analysis, variables were chosen which provide
the reader with an opportunity to view the results operationally. For example,
if it can be shown that pirates are much less likely to board when they are
detected beforehand, no matter whether attacks take place during the day or at
15
night, underway or otherwise, owners might be encouraged to accept the
additional financial burden associated with manning a full-time deck watch.
Similarly, the chance that crew resistance will prevent boardings must be
balanced against the risks associated with potential confrontations between crews
and armed pirates, with its associated consequences.
B. ASSESSMENT.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that vessels of a specific flag are
being targeted in any given region, Figure 5 is included for the purpose of
showing the variety of flags (47 separate countries) that have been attacked. Of
considerable interest here is the number of U.S.-flagged vessels that have been
victims of pirate attacks. Given the small total number of U.S. flagged vessels, the
fact that 21 were attacked over a five year period represents a very high number.
Pirates are not loners. Except in one case where only one pirate was able to
actually board a vessel (accomplices were in a nearby boat), every recorded attack
involved at least 2 pirates. Although women are presumably involved in some
capacity as pirates, no mention was ever found in the data sources of their
involvement during this period of investigation. In many cases (47%), no mention
whatsoever was made regarding the pirates being armed, but in no case was
there a specific reference to the pirates being wnarmed. In a large percentage of
cases, pirates were described simply as "armed" (33%, 92/277). Although direct
16
reference to threats being made against crew members was not often made in the
data, it is presumed that threats are a usual part of the pirate scheme. The
intimidation factor must necessarily be a large part of a pirate's modus operandi.
Although there were only 34 recorded cases where the pirate boarding
location was recorded, 61.7% of these were from the stern of the ship.
Motherships24 were used in six separate attacks. In the 54 cases where a pirate
warning of some kind was made, all but two of these eventually took the form of
shots being fired. In several cases, this was an escalatory process, i.e., if visual,
verbal, or radio communications signals did not convince the vessel to stop, the
more immediate tactic (shots fired at the ship) was used. The type of pirate craft
was identified in 144 cases. By far the largest percentage was listed as
"speedboat" (35.4%), although the 22.9% listed simply as "boat" could presumably
add to this total. Naval craft and fishing boats were recorded as pirate craft 13
times each, but no other type was mentioned in sufficient quantity to warrant
mention.
In 16 cases, the ship's crew felt threatened to the point where they decided
to send a distress signal during the course of the attack or immediately after.
Reports of an attack in progress were made in 20.4% (21/103) of the attacks. In
24Defined as a support vessel for another craft which is used to commit an act
of piracy.
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fact, six crews, anticipating an attack by a suspicious vessel, actually reported that
attack before it occurred.
The exact duration of attack, in the case of short term seizures, was recorded
only 11.1% of the time. The average length of time for these responses was 66
minutes. In one case, a vessel was chased for over four hours before the pirates
gave up. 25 Certain vessel types (especially tankers), employ enough
crewmembers for caretaker duties only. Anti-piracy watches, especially while
underway, are normally not possible given the lack of available manpower.
Therefore, it is understandable why, in seven cases, the pirates boarded, escaped
with loot of some kind, and were never observed by anyone on board. In some
cases, there is absolutely no discernable logic to what the pirates have targeted.
In one attack, for example, an entire set of chairs was stolen, and in another, the
only thing stolen was 50 pairs of shoes which were removed from a deck-loaded
container. This suggests that there is frequently no prior knowledge en the part
of the pirates about what the vessel cargo is. On the other hand, pirates are
25Duration of attack is not a record of time spent onboard only, Rather, it is
a measure of the total period of time when a vessel was pursued plus the time
spent onboard by the pirates.
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sometimes quite clear on what they want, whether it is weapons and ammunition
or currency of only a specific type.26
The difficulty of policing one's vessel while pierside is evidenced by the fact
that in the 34 cases of pierside attacks, only once were the pirates detected before
they boarded. The problem of distinguishing between pirates and ship-contracted
workers is complicated by the fact that in some cases they are one in the same.
The pirate's chose a wide variety of means (depending on the status of the
vessel) to board an intended victim. The preferred method was by grappling
hook (37% of the time). One case indicating prior preparation on the part of the
pirates involved three stowaways who were subsequently joined by about 15
other accomplices once the ship was underway.27
It was interesting to note that mooring lines and various other types of
ship's line were often targeted. These lines are sometimes unraveled and sold to
fishermen for net making, or to other private consumers for use as materials in
wigs. In many cases, when the pirates were not able to open the ship's safe
immediately, the entire safe was removed from the ship. This points to a lack of
26In one case, pirates boarded a vessel and they were "offered" several types
of currency. They "refused" these because they were only interested in Chinese
cash.
27This occurred in the Philippines and was attributed to the Emilio Changco
maritime crime ring. The attack was a permanent seizure. The pirates seized the
vessel for the purpose of committing maritime fraud.
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security for ship's safes that might possibly be corrected by increasing their
weight. For the 36.5% of cases (85 total) where the ship's safe was targeted and
where the currency stolen was recorded in U.S. dollars, the average take was
$12,585.00, with a maximum single robbery amount of $41,000.00.
There were only five cases on record where the crew responded with
firearms, pyrotechnics, or other explosive devices. In one case a Russian naval
amphibious craft was attacked and she responded with rounds from a small
caliber gun which quickly convinced the pirates to abort their attack. Ships'
"rockets," flares, a master's pistol, and one homemade "bomb" were also used by
the more proactive crews determined to prevent pirates from boarding.
In 14 separate cases, the safety-minded crews simply retreated behind locked
accommodation doors and allowed the pirates to come aboard. In these cases,
crew safety obviously took priority over all other considerations. Crews were
taken hostage by attacking pirates in only ten cases. In general, pirates will not
burden themselves with hostages during short term seizures. On many occasions
during short term attacks, crews were bound or otherwise incapacitated while
pirates robbed the vessel. Some pirates apparently felt compelled to hide their
identity by wearing masks (16 cases). In cases where this occurred, all but two
were categorized as short term attacks. Injuries occurred in only 15.8% of attacks.
There were seven recorded cases of vessels being "not under command" for
some period of time during or after a pirate attack. In three of these seven cases,
20
the vessels were tankers of some description, and two of those three attacks
occurred in the heavily-trafficked waters of the Phillip Channel.
There were 20 cases in which a vessel was attacked for a second time.28
Except in cases where these repeat attacks occurred on the same or consecutive
days, this is most likely coincidental. The numbers and percentages of attacks by
vessel type (see Figure 6) are presented only as a means for comparison. The
highest incidences of attack are merely a reflection of the relative numbers of that
type vessel that operate on the world's oceans. Although certain vessel types
have characteristics and modes of operation that make them more likely to be
attacked (i.e., freeboard height and transit speed), and the level of counter-piracy
measures in place will certainly affect its susceptibility to attack, accurate analysis
of this combination of factors was not possible within the constraints of this
database. Nevertheless, several "curious" results are mentioned later on region-
vessel type correlations.
Stationary vessels obviously present a more attractive target to pirates,
boarding a vessel while underway is not a simple task. However, attempts to
board were made even at speeds of up to 21 knots, and successful boardings were
achieved at speeds of 18 knots. More commonly however, pirates were inclined
28This number represents only cases of repeat attack in the five year period.
Given the difficulty of tracking a single vessel (name changes frequently occur
several times a year), this total is probably higher.
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to fire shots at an underway vessel in an effort to get the master to stop and be
boarded. The tactics of increasing speed and using evasive ship movements in
an attempt to prevent boarding was used frequently as a means of deterring
pirate attacks (57 cases). This tactic was successful 87.8% of the time. Radar
contact with incoming pirate vessels was not often reported, either because a
radar watch was not posted or because the sea state or pirate craft type did not
permit easy "painting" of a single, small incoming craft.
Raw numbers of pirate attacks by year are summarized in Figure 7. Well
over half of the attacks (54.2%) occurred in South/East Asia during the five year
period under review. Only Northeast Asia, which experienced an explosive
increase in the number of attacks in 1993, has shown a consistent pattern of
increase (See Figure 11). In nearly every case, piracy has been a local
phenomenon. There is no evidence to suggest that the pirates themselves are
migrating to different regions. It is more likely that it is simply the combination
of local conditions that permit piracy to flourish in any region.
Another characteristic which is clearly typical by region is that of vessel
status at the time of attack. In general, attacks on underway vessels are far more
likely to occur in Asia than in West Africa or South America (see figure 8).
Because vessels not underway are typically either berthed pierside or awaiting
berthing at an anchorage, they are almost always in territorial waters when
attacks occur while not underway.
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Vessels are less inclined to report attacks in areas where the master feels that
a response from shore authorities is unlikely (in East Africa for example), or
counterproductive. However, the Hong Kong Marine Rescue and Coordination
Centre (HKMRCC), the Regional Piracy Centre (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia),29 and
the Singapore authorities, are frequently contacted with reports of pirate attacks.
This is true even when the attack does not occur in the immediate vicinity of
those locations. Their record of past action with respect to prompt and
conscientious investigations is well documented.
With the exception of longer term interdiction cases and the occasional
permanent seizure, attacks have overwhelmingly been of the short term variety
(350 of 370 reported cases). A clear majority of attacks (61.8%) occur in territorial
waters of some country and 81.5% of cases happen at night. 78% of boardings
overall are successful but this number is reduced to 62% when ships are attacked
while underway. This can be contrasted with a 91.2% figure of successful
boardings when ships are stationary. Vessels are twice as likely to be successfully
boarded at night (whether stationary or underway) than during the day (81.1%
versus 40%). Despite the high rate of successful boardings, in 15.4% of the attacks
29i
'Established in October 1992 through the efforts of the International Maritime
Bureau and funded by private sources, the Centre provides 24-hour service to the
merchant shipping community.
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(48 times), the pirates left without taking anything, (see Figure 9 for a summary
of these findings).
When pirates were detected before boarding they were successful in gaining
access to the target in less than one third the registered cases (combined day and
night, 20 versus 63). Ship damage (from slight to a sunken vessel) occurred 11%
of the time and 15.8% of attacks resulted in casualties to crew members. Crews
resisted the pirates in 10.9% of the attacks. Overall, crews were least likely to
resist in South/East Asia (6.7%) and nearly twice as likely to offer resistance in
India (38.1%) as compared to any other region. Casualties were reported twice
as often when the crew did resist.30 Of the 15 total deaths worldwide (5.5%,
15/272 cases reporting an injury), only one occurred in conjunction with crew
resistance. The death rate was unusually high in East Africa (15.4%, 2/13 cases).
One detail of piracy attacks that is indicative of the sponsorship of those
attacks is the distance from shore where they occur. For example, in the
Indonesian region, the average distance from shore for attacks was only 11.55
nautical miles. By contrast, in Northeast Asia, that figure jumped to 68 nautical
miles. Incidents occurring in the South China Sea subregion of South/East Asia
30Guidelines published by many international maritime organizations (EMO,
1MB, Baltic & International Maritime Council (BIMCO), International Shipping
Federation (ISF), U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) et. al.) highlight the
importance of not resisting a pirate attack if the pirates successfully board.
Merchant crews are not equipped or trained to do so. In addition, pirates are
invariably better armed, and much more likely to use violence during an attack.
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averaged 94.4 nautical miles from shore. Sponsorship of attacks occurring over
50 nautical miles out to sea is not the work of small independent operators. It is
simply not economical to mount an operation that far out to sea given the typical
amount of gain that results. Commercial fishermen are frequently behind such
attacks (often attempting to disguise themselves as military or customs officials),
as well as government patrol craft and customs officials, who are acting well
outside the bounds of the 12-mile territorial waters limit recognized by most
states.
An estimate of the degree of sophistication that the pirates employ is the
type of weaponry they use during their attacks. The use of firearms suggests a
level of "professionalization" that is not shared by those who use weapons of
opportunity which are readily available to them in the course of his daily life (i.e.,
knives or machetes). This analysis must be limited in 35.6% (92/258) of these
cases in which weapons were mentioned, pirates were described only as "armed."
No reference to the specific types of weapons employed was made. In
South/East Asia, Indonesia and West Africa, the percentage of cases where
firearms were used is 55.5%, 30%, and 38.5% respectively, see Figure 10). In
Northeast Asia, however, in every case where a weapon was specified, it was a
firearm of some sort. And in South America, firearms were used in 76.2% of the
cases.
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The preceding general review of worldwide piracy was provided for the
purpose of allowing the reader to put the regional analysis that follows into
perspective. Generalizations about piracy at the international level must be
accepted as exactly that (generalizations). This information is provided to the
reader to give the necessary background for presenting the regional analysis, it
is not intended to stand alone.
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III. REGIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT
A. OVERVIEW.
All piracy attacks in the VAS database have been separated into one or
another of 12 general regions. Regional trends analyzed were carried out for only
five of these regions. Consequently, although the data from attacks in the seven
excluded regions are part of the overall data set, they will not be addressed
separately. The regions which do lend themselves to useful analysis are:
South/East Asia (General Region 1), Northeast Asia (General Region 2), Indonesia
(General Region 3), West Africa (General Region 5) and South America (General
Region 8).
Regional assessments were approached systematically, but data peculiarities
associated with individual regions sometimes prevented strict adherence to a
single format. Unique variable combinations within a region of interest also
highlighted the need to deviate from a common analytical format for all regions.
In general, queries which produced information of immediate concern to ship's
masters and crews (such as level of violence/likelihood of injury during pirate
attacks) were the focus of analytical inquiry for the regional analysis. Results are
also presented on the location of pirate attacks. Identifying the "typical" pirate
attack for each region was the goal of the analysis.
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A subregional breakout of each general region is outlined in Figure 1. In the
case of South/East Asia, six of the subregions also contained enough attacks to
allow for a meaningful trends analysis. Although the 12 regions are conveniently
grouped by their geography, they independently cover extremely large areas of
sea space. As explained earlier however, piracy is locally oriented. Some patterns
remain typical throughout the same region and some do not.
B. REGIONAL ASSESSMENT.
1. Region 1: South/East Asia.
This region deserves special attention for two reasons. First, over 54%
of the attacks in this study occurred there. Second, this region has received the
most international attention. Consequently, the available data are the most
complete. Therefore, this region yields the best possible analytical results.
As Figure 11 shows, the peak year for region 1 was 1991. A series of
bilateral agreements between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore following the
1991 spike, resulted in a dramatic decrease in piracy in this region. This decrease
is best illustrated by examining the frequency of attacks in the areas of the
Singapore Strait, Phillip Channel and Malacca Strait for the 1991-1993 time period
(Figure 12). There have been no reported attacks in the Singapore Strait or Phillip
Channel in 1993, and all three of the attacks reported in the Malacca Strait
occurred in the northern portion of that waterway. As Figure 12 also
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demonstrates, pirate activity in the Anambas Islands,31 (which are Indonesian32),
was nearly eliminated following three years of steadily increasing pirate activity
until 1991. By contrast, activity near Philippine waters has steadily increased, this
being primarily due to the relative lack of attention (when compared to the Straits
measures) given to the piracy problem by Philippine authorities.
By examining Figure 13, it is clear why pirates in the Singapore area
practice their trade with virtual immunity in the absence of effective anti-piracy
measures. The Straits area is the most heavily trafficked maritime crossroads in
the world.33 The long established Singapore Strait traffic separation scheme
requires certain eastbound vessels to use the Phillip Channel. The traffic density
and hazards associated with this transit require vessels to slow down to negotiate
these tricky waters, making them prime targets for pirates. Tankers have been
targeted worldwide 25.5% of the time, but 38.5% of attacks in the Phillip Channel
were made against tanker assets. This suggests that the mandatory traffic
separation scheme did help influence pirate target selection in that area.
31The Kepaulaun Anambas island group (See Figure 2) is located
approximately 160 nm NE of Singapore. Ships traveling from Singapore to Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and China must pass near these islands.
32These islands are part of the South/East region.
^Approximately 200 vessels transit this area daily.
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Pirates in region 1 have typically targeted personal items (72 cases), the
master's safe (52 cases), and personal cash (38 cases) during their attacks.
Electrical goods, such as televisions, video cassette recorders and stereos (7 cases
only), have rarely been a target of the pirates here. Ship's cargo (12 cases) and
ship's equipment (19 cases) have been targeted less often. Pirate preference in
this region is for the less bulky cash and personal valuables.
Pirates have typically kept their numbers small in this region, the
average number per attack (111 reported cases) was just 7.32. Attacks have
traditionally been at night, but as Figure 14 clearly demonstrates, this percentage
has dropped off sharply in 1993. The decrease in the number of attacks in the
Singapore area is coincident with an increase in piracy in the South China Sea
during the same period (where attacks occur more often during the day).
Nevertheless, the underway percentage has remained high over the years, (see
Figure 15) This same trend is responsible for the sharp increase in the percentage
of attacks taking place in international waters (see Figure 16). Clearly, the overall
percentage of attacks occurring in Region 1 is again on the increase. (See Figure
17) One final manifestation of this shift in pirate activity in region 1 is the
boarding success rate (see Figure 18).
2. Region 2: Northeast Asia.
Northeast Asia presents a very interesting case for study because 80.7%
of all attacks (25/31) recorded there occurred in 1993. This in itself is the most
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dramatic trend for the region. Additionally, there are quite a number of unusual
facts that emerge from the region 2 analysis. For example, although 100% of the
cases which report a weapon used during an attack listed it as some kind of
firearm (15 cases), the injury rate in these cases was only 5.9%, well below the
15.8% average for all regions. Determining a distance from shore at the time of
attack was possible in 25 of the 31 attacks and the average distance was 68
nautical miles. 84.6% of the attacks took place on underway vessels (22/26) and
two of the remaining cases involved ships that were "drifting."
Although fishing vessels account for only 5.7% of all targeted vessels
worldwide, 34.5% of the victim craft in Northeast Asia were of that type. Nearly
96% (21 /22) of the attacks were short term seizures, but a target was identified
in only six of those cases. Boarding success in this region was only 51.8%,
compared with 78.3% overall, and the time of attack was split nearly evenly, with
ten of 19 attacks occurring at night. 82.2% of the attacks occurred in international
waters and all five cases of attack in territorial waters occurred in China. Two of
these five cases were interdiction. During four successful boardings, no loot was
stolen.
Although only 21 Russian-flagged vessels have been attacked
worldwide during the reporting period, 12 of them were among the 25 cases in
this region where a flag was reported. Part of the reason for this can be
attributed to the proximity of Russia to this region. Nevertheless, the territorial
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disputes that have intensified between Russia and China may also be partly to
blame for this unusually high incidence of Russian vessel victimization. Of the
16 cases where pirates were detected before boarding, nine of the boarding
attempts were unsuccessful (43.7% success rate, double the international average).
Crews either increased their speed or used evasive movement 11 times, and eight
of these times, the pirates did not successfully board. There were 19 cases where
the type of craft was recorded and nine of these responses involved military craft
(seven naval craft or patrol boats and two "former" naval craft). But of the nine
cases, only three involved interdiction.
The number of pirates were logged in ten cases and the average
number of pirates per attack was 9.5, slightly higher than the international
average of 7.98. Pirates gave a warning in this region 45.2% of the time (14
times), and in every case, shots were fired. Ship damage occurred 38.5% of the
time, close to the 35.8% average for all attacks in every region. Although attacks
appear to have "migrated" into this region (from Region 1) and portions of the
northern South China Sea, one is again cautioned not to infer that these incidents
were carried out by the same pirates who, in the face of countermeasures, simply
transferred their base of operations.
3. Region 3: Indonesia.
Analysis of attacks in Region 3 also uncovered some unusual results.
The "Vicinity Bintan Island" subregion was created to classify the incidents that
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occurred near Singapore, but were distinct from the more congested areas in its
immediate vicinity (see Figure 13). When vessels approach Horsburgh Light
headed eastbound (approximately 35 nautical miles from Singapore), they travel
through one of three separate channels depending on their destination. Those
vessels heading south or southeast, which remain near Bintan and Mapor islands
run a much higher risk of being pirated in this region. A total of 22 attacks were
classified here over the five year period. As with all attacks in the Indonesian
area of responsibility, frequency dropped off dramatically between 1992 and 1993
(see Figure 19). Of all regions that recorded attacks involving deaths, Indonesia
had the lowest overall percentage (3.1%). Injuries of some sort, however, were
more common here (19.3% compared with the 15.8% international average).
Attacks occurred at night 88% of the time, but attacks in territorial
(47.7%) and international waters (52.3%) occurred with nearly the same frequency.
Underway assaults were attempted 64.3% of the time. 95.1% of all region 3
attacks were short term seizures. Targets were typically limited to small, light
and transportable items (cash, personal effects, and safe contents). Electrical
goods were rarely targeted (only 5.5% of the time), but ship's equipment was
taken in over 30% of the cases. Attackers were able to successfully board on
72.1% of their attempts, but this success rate dropped to one third of that average
(23.1%) when they were detected before trying to board. Crews resisted in eight
cases. In seven of these cases, boarding was thwarted, with no injury to the
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crews. But in the one case where boarding was successful, one crewmember was
slightly injured. Pirates were unlikely to provide a warning before boarding, but
in both cases where one was issued, shots were fired. There were no cases of
interdiction.
Knives, machetes, or swords were used exclusively in 37.5% of the
region 3 attacks, and firearms were used with the least frequency in any of the
top five regions (18.75%). Ship damage occurred in only 20% of the cases, well
below the international average of 35.8%. In general, Indonesian pirates were less
well armed, and less likely to commit indiscriminate violence than pirates in the
other main regions under review.
4. Region 5: West Africa.
Pirate attacks in West Africa follow a very predictable pattern.
Illustrating trends for individual countries is difficult because even in the areas
where merchants are most often victimized, there are still relatively few attacks
overall. However, a general description of attacks can be made. Nigerian ports
recorded the most attacks in this region (11), with eight of these taking place in
Lagos. There were nine attacks in Cameroon, eight of these occurred in Douala
(See Figure 20). The remainder of the attacks were spread over six other
countries (Angola-6, Ivory Coast-5, Senegal-4, Guinea-2, Sierra Leone-2, and
Ghana-1). Nearly half (16) the total number of attacks occurred in 1992, and six
of the eight attacks which took place overall in Douala, occurred that year. The
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only other anomaly occurred in 1990. In that year, three of the five Abidjan,
Ivory Coast attacks were recorded.
Injuries of some severity were sustained by crew members only 13.6%
of the time (15.8% is the average over all regions), and crew resistance was
reported 17.5% of the time (well above the overall average of 10.9%). All but
three of the 34 attacks reporting a time category occurred at night, and only one
of 37 took place in international waters. Likewise, only one attack was launched
against a vessel that was underway. As one would expect, vessels that were
attacked while stationary were all short term seizures, and a warning was given
in only one case. Nearly twice as many attacks occurred in an anchorage (23) as
pierside (12) and one took place while the vessel was moored. Given the static
conditions of attack, it is not surprising that boarding was successful 91.9% of the
time (the highest of any region). Pirates were detected before they attempted
boarding at night five times (14.7%), which was about average for stationary
vessels (14.1%).
Of the 29 cases where something was targeted, 62.1% (18 times) it was
ship's equipment. Cargo was taken seven times and the ship's safe was robbed
only once. In two separate cases, 100 pirates were reported to have boarded a
vessel. Attacks in West Africa offer no real surprises to those familiar with
piracy, but the modus operandi is notably different than for Asia. The capability
of governments in West Africa to counter pirate attacks is virtually non-existent
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and local pirates take advantage of that fact. The attacks are really just
unsophisticated maritime robbery, and the likelihood of a dramatic change in the
level, scope, and modus operandi of these attacks in the near future is doubtful.
5. Region 8: South America.
This region is quite similar in many respects to West Africa. As in the
case of West Africa, one can be fairly confident about how a pirate attack will be
carried out. The other regional constant is the indifference of local authorities to
those attacks. Attacks in South American waters are essentially low scale crime,
but the potential for violence is especially high. Brazil saw the greatest
concentration of attacks in this region (26 total), and this accounted for 61.9% of
all attacks in South America (see Figure 21). 53.8% of the Brazilian attacks took
place in Rio de Janeiro, but pirates attacked in seven different locations around
the country. Although only one attack was reported in Santos, Brazil in this
database, attacks of port violence there are consistently reported at epidemic levels.
All 42 of the cases in South America occurred in territorial waters and
93.3% took place at night. Only 8.1% of attacks were conducted on underway
vessels, 27% were pierside, and 64.8% happened in an anchorage. In every case
reporting a duration of attack (38 cases), it was a short term seizure. All types of
loot were targeted by South American pirates, including safes, which were hit
eight times of the 30 times that a target was specified. The average number of
pirates (reported 71.4% of the time) was 7.7 per attack, and just as in West Africa,
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the pirates gave no warnings before boarding. Boarding success was recorded at
89.5%, and pirates were detected before boarding 21.4% of the time. In the three
cases that pirates were detected before boarding, the crew prevented them from
coming aboard. The injury rate was 26% (the international average is 15.8%), a
reflection of the high percentage that firearms were used in this region.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A. REVIEW.
During the proposal phase of this project, the author was warned by many
observers not to expect to locate the kind of quality data required to complete the
Violence At Sea database. Although the sources used in the assembly of this
database were by no means totally exhaustive, the level of detail achieved as a
product of those sources is much more comprehensive than one could have
expected given the predictions of those associated with individual data sources.
Frequent reference was also made to the traditional reluctance on the part of
shipowners and other maritime agencies to provide data. Time constraints did
not permit a full exploitation of the data that is certainly available, but those
individuals and organizations that were contacted were uniformly helpful and
provided as much data as they possessed. As future researchers become more
familiar with available data sources and develop strong cooperative relationships
with various maritime agencies, source availability will undoubtedly expand.
This five-year overview of the depth and breadth of maritime piracy will
educate those who are unfamiliar with piracy. One must appreciate the scope of
piracy to be able to assess its potential impact on international maritime trade.
Pirates will continue to plague merchant shipping for the foreseeable future.
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Closer examination of the results from the VAS database will prepare the prudent
mariner for the prospect of pirate attacks. Although the results presented in this
study represent a first level assessment of the data on piracy over the last five
years, the full utility of the VAS database has yet to be tested. There is a wealth
of information in the VAS database that is available to the innovative researcher.
The analytical value of this source will grow as the database is gradually
extended in time.
B. CONCLUSIONS.
The dramatic downturn of piracy following the 1991-1992 peak in the
Malacca Strait/Singapore Strait/Phillip Channel area is attributable to the
combined effect of international pressure by the coastal states of Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, and the concerted efforts of maritime players
everywhere. Hot pursuit agreements between unusually cooperative nations in
that region, in particular, contributed to the unprecedented decrease in pirate
attacks. Although there is no simple explanation for why piracy breeds in certain
areas, one thing is certain, industry pressure and governmental action are key
factors in its suppression.
This assessment has not attempted to speculate in detail about specific ways
in which attacks of piracy can be reduced. Piracy, with few exceptions, represents
simple criminal activity. Consequently, to defeat it, there can be no substitute for
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effective law enforcement. The solution, however, will prove to be more difficult
than defining the problem. One cannot presume to suggest what measures are
appropriate in any region without first taking into account the financial, material,
and political constraints that face those countries that are confronted with a piracy
threat. Describing the attacks as they typically occur in each region is the first
step in formulating a plan of action.
The purpose of this thesis was to create a comprehensive database on piracy.
The resulting Violence At Sea database is the most complete data repository of
its kind. The summary contained in this assessment was designed to give the
reader a brief introduction to the way in which the VAS database can contribute
the larger analytical examination of maritime piracy.
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APPENDIX A
VIOLENCE AT SEA DATABASE
VAS ID: I I
DATE: l_l_l_l_l_l_l
Y Y M M D D
VESSEL NAME:
FLAG: I I I
OWNER:





DMA_REG (DMA Geographical Subregion): I _ I _ I
LATITUDE: l_l_l l_J_U_l l_l
LONGITUDE: l_l_l_l l_l_l.l_l l_l
GRL REGION/SUB REG : See Codebook
I
WATERS: 1. International 2. Territorial
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WATERS-CNTRY: l_l_l Country





1. Underway 2. Pierside 3. At anchor 4. Under Tow
5. Drifting 6. At an Anchorage
7. Disabled (Non-manueverable) 8. Moored





CREW_SIZE: I_ I _ I
CREW_NAT_M: l_l_l CREW_NAT_OFF: l_l_l CREW_NAT_C: l_l
SHIP_LGTH: l_l_l_l (Meters)
PAST_ATT: (Previous History of Pirate Attack): 1. Yes 2. No
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PAST_RT: (Same Route): 1. Yes 2. No
PURPOSE: 1. Short Term 2. Long Term 3. Permament






3. TAR_CARGO (Specific Cargo)
LOOT_CARGO:
4. TAR_PERS (Personal Effects)
LOOT_PERS: (Personal Cash/Belongings)
5. TAR_EQUIP (Ship's Equipment)
LOOT_SH_EQUIP:
6. TAR_SAFE (Master's Safe)
LOOT_MAS_SAFE:













USEJLIGHT l_l USE_WATCANON l_l USE_ALARM l_l
USE_WATCH (Deck) l_l USE_WATCH (Bridge) USE_RADAR l_l
USE_INCSPEED l_l USE_CREWRESIS l_l USE_WEAPONS l_
USE_EVASMVT l_l (Evasive Movement)
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
PRO_BARR_U 1. Yes 2. No
PRO_BARR: Protective Barricade Location for the Crew
ATTACKERS :
NUM_PIRATES: l_l_l_l
BOARD_SUCCESS: 1. Yes 2. No 3. No Attempt
(Boarding Successful)
PIR_OBS: 1. Yes 2. No [Pirates Observed while onboard, or
attempting to board?]
PIR_ARMED: 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown
PIR_WPNS_USED: (Weapons used) I I I Code Book (most dangerous)
APP_NAT: (Appearance, Nationality) I I I
APP_MASKED: 1. Yes 2. No
METHOD_BRDING: (Method of Boarding) l_l See Code Book
PLACE_BOARD: (Place of Boarding) 1. Bow 2. Stern 3. Amidships
4. Port 5. Starboard
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SPONSOR: l_l SPONSOR_CTRY: l_l_l
1. Unauthorized Military 2. Impersonating Military
3. Authorized Military 4. Country Sanctioned /Non-military
5. Organized Crime 6. Independent Operator 7. Unknown
SHORE_CORRUPT: (Shore-based Collusion/Corruption)
1. Insider (Already on board)
2. Shipping Administration
3. Law Enforcement/Military
DET_BEF_BOARD: (Presence Detected Before Boarding) 1. Yes 2. No
PIR_VES_BASING: 1. Land 2. Sea 3. Man-made Fixed Based
BASE_COUNTRY: I _ I_ I
MOMJJSED: (Mothership Used): 1. Yes 2. No 3. Self-Supporting
MOMJDENT:
PIRATE_WARN: 1. Yes 2. No (Pirate Warning given before boarding)
TYPE_PIR_WARN: 1. Verbal 2. Elec Comms 3. Shots Fired 4. Visual/Light
TYPE_PIR_CRAFT: I _ I _ I See Code Book
CRAFT_FEAT1: l_l_l CRAFT_FEAT2: l_l_l CRAFT_FEAT3:
(Color) (Hull Construction) (Other)
See Code Book
PIR_CRAFT_CAP: (Speed Capability) l_l_l [Knots]
PIR_CRAFT_LEN: (Length) l_l_J_l [Meters]
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CASUALTIES
CASUALTIES. 1. Yes 2. No
MAS_INJ: 1. Yes 2. No
OFFJNJ: 1. Yes 2. No
NUM_OFF_INJ: I_ I
CREWJNJ: 1. Yes 2. No
NUM_CREW_INJ: l_l_l
HOSTAGE TAKEN: 1. Yes 2. No
MAS DEATH: 1. Yes 2. No
OFF_DEATH: 1. Yes 2. No
NUM OFF-DEAD: I I
CREW DEATH: 1. Yes 2. No
NUM CREW DEAD: I I I
CLASSJNJURIES:
Code as most serious
1. No Injuries
2. Minor Injuries
3. Medium Injuries (attended to on board)
4. Serious Injuries (major attention, medevac reqd)
5. Death
RESPONSE
VERB_REPORT: 1. Before Attack 2. During Attack
3. Immediately After Attack
REPORT WATERS: 1. Territorial Waters 2. International Waters
REP PORT:
REP SHORE:
1. Yes 2. No
1. Yes 2. No
REP SHIPOWNER: 1. Yes 2. No
REP IMO:
REP RCC:
1. Yes 2. No
1. Yes 2. No [Rescue & Coordination Center]
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REP_IMB: 1. Yes 2. No
REP OTHER: I II
INVESTIGATION: 1. Territorial State 2. Internal (Shipowner)
3. Other Party



















PORT_DIRECT: l_l (Port Direction)
1. Inbound 2. Outbound 3. At Sea 4. In Port 5. In an anchorage
COMMENTS/MISCELLANEOUS
SOURCE: See Codebook
VESSEL_U_CMD: 1. Yes 2. No
PIR_CAUGHT: 1. Yes 2. No
ACT COAST ST:
THREATS_MADE: 1. Yes 2. No






South/East Asia *.1. Mediterranean
1. Anambas Islands 1. Algeria (AG)
2. Burma (BM) 2. Lebanon (LE)
3. South China Sea 3. Greece (GR)
4. East Malaysia 4. France (FR)
5. Gulf of Thailand
6. Malaysia (MY) I5. West Africa
8. Hong Kong (HK)
9. Malacca Strait 1. Angola (AO)
10. Pacific Ocean 2. Ghana (GH)
11. Philippines (RP) 3. Guinea (GV)
12. Phillip Channel 4. Ivory Coast (IV)
13. Singapore (SN) 5. Nigeria (NI)
14. Singapore Strait 6. Senegal (SG)
15. Taiwan (TW) 7. Sierra Leone (SL)





1. East China Sea 2. Gulf of Aden
2. Sea of Japan 3. Madagascar (MA)
3. Yellow Sea 4. Red Sea
4. China (CH) 5. Somalia (SO)





2. Borneo 1. Belize (BH)
3. Celebes Sea 2. Costa Rica (CS)
4. Java Sea 3. El Salvador (ES)
5. Sumatra 4. Guatemala (GT)
6. Java 5. Honduras (HO)
7. Vicinity Bintan Island 6. Nicaragua (NU)





South America 11. Middle East
1. Brazil (BR) 1. Persian Gulf
2. Colombia (CO) 2. Saudi Arabia (SA)
3. Ecuador (EC) 3. Gulf of Oman
4. Guyana (GY) 4. Strait of Hormuz
5. Paraguay (PA)
6. Peru (PE) 12. Miscellaneous
7. Venezuela (VE)
1. Australia/New Zealand
India 2. Black Sea
3. Caribbean Sea
1. Arabian Sea 4. Romania (RO)
2. Bangladesh (BG) 5. South Africa (SF)
3. Bay of Bengal
4. Indian Ocean
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